

How did the Heritage Foundation and Ronald Reagan each conceptualize deregulation, and how were these ideas implemented in the 1980s policy landscape?

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Abstract:

This paper looks into how the Heritage Foundation's free-market ideas influenced the deregulatory policies of the Reagan administration during the 1980s. It compares the Heritage Foundation's detailed deregulatory plan from Mandate for Leadership II (1980) with Reagan's executive orders, legislative actions, and various scholarly opinions. The research highlights key areas where Reagan's approach differed from what Heritage proposed. While the Heritage Foundation wanted to fully eliminate federal regulations in sectors like energy, transportation, telecommunications, and environmental protection, Reagan chose to modify or even reject some of these ideas. This shows how complex it can be to implement policies and the challenges that arise when balancing different political beliefs within a diverse democratic system.

Keywords: Heritage foundation, Reagan administration, Policy implementation, 1980s deregulation, Regulatory policy

1. Introduction

The 1980s deregulation movement marked a transformative period in American economic and administrative governance. Decades of expanding regulations, rooted in bipartisan support for the government's role in managing markets and protecting consumers, faced a powerful countermovement advocating for a rollback of regulatory controls.

The Heritage Foundation, a relatively new think tank, emerged as a key intellectual force, providing an ideational foundation for deregulation rooted in free-market economic theory and classical liberal

principles. The Foundation framed deregulation as a moral necessity to restore individual liberty, encourage economic growth, and curb the perceived overreach of the administrative state.

While the Reagan administration publicly embraced deregulation and shared many ideological goals with the Heritage Foundation, its approach was selective and pragmatic. Reagan pursued a deregulatory agenda that balanced such aims with political realities, often implementing only parts of the Heritage Foundation's vision and modifying or rejecting other priorities.

In this paper, I will argue, therefore, that even though Reagan was sympathetic to many of the conservative goals, his administration rejected important Heritage Foundation priorities, showing that conservative think tanks in the 1980s faced serious sociopolitical barriers that kept them from fully shaping government policy. This paper will also show that the reasons behind these rejections are not solely due to opposition from Democrats or entrenched bureaucrats but also stem from Reagan's own strategic calculations and prioritization of specific goals within the broader conservative agenda.

2. The Heritage Foundation's Vision: Ideological Foundations and Policy Prescriptions

Founded in 1973, the Heritage Foundation rapidly established itself as a preeminent conservative policy incubator, pushing a strong critique of the expanding regulatory state.¹ By the end of the decade, its *Mandate for Leadership II* (1980) had become a key document, systematically detailing a comprehensive plan to reduce regulation and firmly placing market-based principles at the center of its framework.²

2.1 . Ideological Framework: Economic Liberty and Market Primacy

The Heritage Foundation's ideological framework drew heavily on classical liberal economic thought, particularly the conception of markets as self-regulating mechanisms that maximize efficiency and safeguard individual liberty. In itself, they believed government involvement usually created unwanted problems—including "rent-seeking behavior, bureaucratic bloat, and distortions of fair market dynamics." Hence, the Foundation asserted that "free markets, when unhindered by regulation, function optimally."³

The Foundation connected its beliefs to a larger political philosophy that focused on individual freedom, limited government, and a strong distrust of centralized authority.⁴ Vice President Cherny's comments show that Heritage's conservative views included a strong moral stance on free markets, framing deregulation not just as an economic need but also as a way to protect liberty. They argued that deregulation was more than just changing policies; it was about fixing the issues caused by too much government involvement, which they believed violated basic freedoms. They presented deregulation as a moral mission to restore the "natural" order of free enterprise, directly linking freedom to economic success.⁵

Key figures at Heritage consistently criticized the regulatory state as a barrier to prosperity and innovation, seeing it as a rather intrusive and uninformed system that dis-

couraged entrepreneurship. Moe's work on bureaucratic politics helps to corroborate the administrative resistance Heritage anticipated by framing the regulatory state as a self-protective bureaucracy hostile to free-market reforms.⁶ The Foundation's goal was to reassert the importance of individualism and minimal government intervention, as well as to fix any perceived economic problems.

2.2 . Detailed Policy Prescriptions (Primary Source Analysis)

The *Mandate for Leadership II* outlined specific reforms aimed at reducing the federal government's regulatory reach in several sectors. The report called for eliminating the *Public Utility Holding Company Act*, arguing it restricted investment and innovation in electric utilities, thereby slowing economic growth and limiting options for consumers.⁵

In energy markets, Heritage advocated for phasing out federal price controls, arguing they distorted supply signals and artificially constrained the natural gas and oil sectors.⁵ The Foundation saw government price-setting as a major cause of shortages, inefficiencies, and ultimately, reduced economic production.

In the realm of transportation, the report urged the removal of artificial barriers that hindered competition in trucking, railroads, and airlines—sectors where federal controls on routes, rates, and market entry had allegedly created monopolistic or oligopolistic conditions. Telecommunications reforms were similarly envisioned, with proposals to "privatize and liberalize markets dominated by vertically integrated incumbents."⁵

Taken as a whole, these proposals formed a clear plan for deregulation across key parts of the American economy. Heritage aimed to empower markets through systematic deregulation, which meant reducing federal overreach and encouraging innovation, efficiency, and greater consumer choice.

2.3 . Anticipating Criticism and Responding to It

In anticipation of criticisms about the risks of deregulation, the Heritage Foundation prepared strong counter-arguments. They claimed that regulations often made problems worse instead of solving them, using examples where government involvement led to issues like rationing, lower product quality, and confused market signals. The Foundation believed that consumer choice and competition could manage industries better than government oversight could. They argued that deregulation would give more power to consumers and entrepreneurs, allowing the economy to adjust itself more quickly than if it were held back by government rules. However, Paul Pierson pointed out that Heritage's faith in market self-correction

overlooked how slow and difficult regulatory changes can be. These changes typically happen gradually and are influenced by political conflicts and institutional pushback. This shows that the Heritage position had some overly optimistic assumptions, as it didn't fully recognize the delays that often happen in policymaking. Still, their responses to anticipated critiques helped build the Foundation's confidence in its beliefs, emphasizing their strong commitment to the idea that markets, even in areas usually seen as monopolies, are effective and morally superior.

2.4 . Budgetary and Institutional Strategy

In addition to deregulation proposals for specific sectors, the *Mandate for Leadership II* advocated for aggressive budget cuts to regulatory agencies as a direct way of curbing bureaucratic power.⁷ Heritage envisioned a "New Federalism," imagining a major transfer of authority from the federal government down to the individual states. It suggested that decentralized governance would better promote competition in regulation and preserve individual freedom by adapting policy solutions to different local conditions. Increasingly, though, such an aspect of the Heritage Foundation's agenda, while appealing to some conservatives, created friction with other factions who believed in a strong national defense and a unified national economy.⁸

2.5 . Rhetorical and Political Context

The strong language used in *Mandate for Leadership II* aimed to build political support by presenting deregulation as both urgent and unavoidable. It tied the push for deregulation to a larger conservative movement fighting against a large and ineffective government.⁹ This message connected with core American values like individual freedom and limited government, making Heritage's agenda very appealing to right-wing politics. However, the forceful tone also risked alienating moderate voters who were wary of dismantling regulations that protected consumers or the environment.

3. Ronald Reagan's Desires: Selective Adoption and Strategic Pushback

Proponents of the administration would think the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 created a favorable opportunity to translate the Heritage Foundation's ideological blueprint into concrete federal policy.¹⁰ Yet, while Reagan embraced the rhetoric of deregulation and implemented several important reforms, his administration's record reveals a deeper pattern of selective adoption and rejection, showing how H.F. (Heritage Foundation) struggled to make its mark.¹¹

3.1 . Ideological Foundations in Reagan's Rhetoric

Reagan's inaugural address really resonated with the Heritage Foundation's worldview. His famous line from the 1980 speech—"government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem"—clearly rejected federal regulation and intervention.¹²

Throughout his time in office, Reagan kept mentioning the importance of reducing government and bringing back market forces. He often highlighted deregulation as a crucial part of economic recovery and national renewal, creating a consistent message that aligned with the core ideas promoted by the Heritage Foundation.¹³

Even though Reagan talked a lot about deregulation, he really understood that governing is complicated. He often stressed the need to take things slow and step-by-step, recognizing that there were political and institutional limits that would naturally slow down deregulation.⁹ Hacker's analysis points out that this gradual approach is key to understanding why the implementation of deregulation policies was so uneven during Reagan's presidency.¹⁴ His pragmatic style was intentional, allowing him to be flexible and make incremental progress.¹⁵

3.2 . Major Legislative Deregulation Measures

Among Reagan's signature legislative achievements were landmark deregulation laws. The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 deregulated the trucking industry, dismantling rate and market entry controls that had historically shielded industry incumbents from competition.¹⁶ The resultant increase in competition reduced costs and expanded freight options, aligning closely with the HF's prescriptions.¹⁷

Reagan's transportation reforms extended to airlines and railroads. Building on Carter's Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Reagan's tenure further loosened federal controls, contributing to fare reductions and greater consumer choice, but also leading to industry consolidation and labor unrest.¹⁸ These incremental yet impactful reforms reflect a selective and sector-specific realization of the Heritage Foundation's blueprint.¹⁹ While Reagan embraced deregulation in these areas, he also recognized the need to manage the potential negative consequences, such as job losses or decreased safety standards²³, demonstrating a pragmatic approach that tempered the Heritage Foundation's more ideological vision.

3.3 . Energy Sector Deregulation

Energy Sector Deregulation Energy deregulation is a key area of policy discussion. Reagan aimed to gradually remove federal price controls on natural gas through changes in regulations, which aligned with the Heritage Foundation's criticism of price distortions.²⁰ However, the deregulation of the oil and electricity sectors moved more

slowly because of their importance.²¹

Political pushback from industry groups and environmental advocates made things even more complicated, limiting what the administration could do and forcing them to carefully balance interests to keep coalitions intact and maintain market stability.²² Reagan's cautious approach in the energy sector shows that he prioritized practical politics over just sticking to ideological ideals, understanding that completely removing regulations could upset important stakeholders and disrupt the energy market.

3.4 . Administrative and Executive Actions by Reagan

Reagan's strategic use of executive orders, exemplified by Executive Order 12291, complemented his legislative efforts by centralizing regulatory review within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). While this order, requiring agencies to conduct thorough cost-benefit analyses and creating a system to limit future regulatory growth, appears at first glance to fully support H.F. priorities, OMB's own reports showcase that it did not significantly halt the growth of certain sectors, revealing a deviation from the Foundation's broader desire to cut and dismantle regulations.²³

While EO 12291 changed procedures significantly, it did not remove agencies' authority to regulate. Instead, it represented an adjustment in administration, showing Reagan's preference for practical control rather than completely dismantling the regulatory system.

3.5 . Areas of Strategic Pushback and Moderation by the Administration

Reagan's administration exhibited notable hesitation on certain deregulation proposals. Telecommunications deregulation unfolded incrementally, as increasing resistance and market complexity slowed the pace of reforms.²⁴ Environmental regulation experienced budgetary cuts and enforcement slowdowns, but the administration refrained from dismantling or disbanding the EPA.

Congressional pushback and public scrutiny really slowed the administration's efforts to fully carry out its deregulatory plans. Reagan's pragmatic approach aimed to balance his ideological goals with the realities of politics, which meant that some proposals had to be dropped. This makes it harder to see a clear picture of his enthusiasm for deregulation. Reagan's more moderate stance on environmental regulations shows that he understood the political risks of looking anti-environment, which ultimately prioritized long-term political stability over quick ideological wins. Reagan faced a political environment where conservatives were gaining power, but many government agencies and interest groups resisted change. Problems like slow-moving bureaucracies, strong opposition from established

groups, and economic troubles from the early 1980s recessions made reform difficult. Because of these challenges, Reagan had to carefully choose which changes to push forward and negotiate skillfully, showing that his approach to deregulation was flexible and practical.

4. Conclusion

In the 1980s, deregulation was largely inspired by the conservative ideas promoted by the Heritage Foundation. However, the Reagan administration applied these ideas selectively, within a complicated political and institutional environment. While Heritage pushed for a broad rollback of federal regulations based on strong free-market beliefs, Reagan made practical decisions to accept, change, or reject parts of their vision depending on political realities. This shows that even with a sympathetic president, complex negotiation, rejection, and practical problem-solving occur when considering the broader political agenda.

To really grasp the effects of deregulation, it's important to see the balance between ambitious ideas and what could actually happen politically. The relationship between the Heritage Foundation and the Reagan administration gives us a useful lens to understand how policymaking is shaped by limits on executive power and the ongoing influence of regulatory institutions. Future research should dive deeper into the roles of government agencies, interest groups, and public opinion in shaping policy development. This will help us understand how big ideas translate into real policies in democratic systems.

This study combines intellectual history with a detailed analysis of policy and politics. It builds its main arguments through a close look at primary sources, such as Heritage Foundation publications, executive orders from the Reagan administration, and presidential speeches. The research is further supported by a broad review of secondary literature. While it acknowledges potential biases in the archives and publications, using multiple sources strengthens the study and offers a richer understanding of the different forces at play in deregulation.

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